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TIE BREAKDOWN OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY: WHY
WELFARE REFORM IS NOT THE ANSWER
ALLISON B. SMITH*
In May of 1992, former Vice President Dan Quayle gave per-
haps the most famous speech of his career to a civic group in
Washington, D.C. In his speech, Quayle targeted the deteriora-
tion of the traditional nuclear family as the underlying cause of
many of the nation's most serious problems, and in the process
opened himself up to the censure and ridicule of the American
public by criticizing the television character, Murphy Brown, for
bearing a child out-of-wedlock.1 In condemning the current
trend towards the acceptance of single-parenthood, divorce, ille-
gitimacy, and other "non-traditional" family structures, Quayle
complained that "[i] t doesn't help matters when prime-time TV
has Murphy Brown-a character who supposedly epitomizes
today's intelligent, highly paid, professional woman-mocking
the importance of fathers by bearing a child alone and calling it
just another lifestyle choice."2 In this same speech, Quayle cited
figures illustrating the far greater poverty levels of families
headed by single parents, and made the claim that "[m]arriage is
probably the best anti-poverty program of all."' Quayle empha-
sized an urgent need for government policies which "reinforce
values such as family, hard work, integrity, and personal
responsibility."4
Quayle was not the first or last to place much of the blame
for poverty and the breakdown of the family on a welfare system
"that impedes individual efforts to move ahead in society, and
hampers [welfare recipients'] ability to take advantage of the
opportunities America offers."5 Throughout his speech, Quayle
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returned to blaming welfare programs as the major contributor
to family breakdown, claiming that welfare checks have replaced
the father's role in many families.6 According to Quayle, by per-
petuating a welfare system that is responsible for diminishing
traditional families, the government is not upholding its duty to
reinforce "traditional" values and the family.
Despite the criticism and ridicule he has received,7 Quayle's
identification of the deterioration of the traditional family as a
crucial issue for the 1990s was actually predictive of what was to
come. At the time Quayle delivered his speech, even President
Bush did not offer public support for his vice-president's criti-
cism of Murphy Brown's choice to have a child out-of-wedlock.8
However, between the time of his speech in 1992 and 1994, the
apparent changes in family structure in the United States over
the past few decades had become a nationwide concern of unde-
niable importance. By 1994, the country had done a complete
about-face. Even Donna Shalala, President Clinton's Secretary of
Health and Human Services, specifically agreed with Quayle's
assessment of the impact of Murphy Brown's choice stating that
she did not believe "anyone in public life today ought to con-
done women having children out-of-wedlock... even if the fam-
ily is financially able."9
Living in single-parent and other non-traditional families
has proven to be harmful to children, and between 1992, the
year of Quayle's speech, and 1996 there was an explosion of con-
cern in the media and across the country about the effects that
teen-age pregnancy, divorce, illegitimacy, and single-mother-
hood are having in the United States.10 There are today few who
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Jim Puzzanghera, Poll: Murphy Edges Dan for President, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, May 31, 1992, at 10; Jeff Simon, Latest Rantings Show Griffin and Quayle
Losing Grip on Reality, BuFF. NEws, May 26, 1992, at Cl; Quayle's 'Pulpit of Bull,'
BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 1992, at 10; Dick Williams, The President Hangs Dan
Quayle out to Dy, ATLANrAJ. & CONST., May 26, 1992, at A9.
8. Dan Quayle vs. Murphy Brown (the Vice President Attacks the Values of a
Television Show), TIME, June 1, 1992, at 20.
9. Donna Shalala Does a Dan Quayle, Slams Murphy Brown, ORLANO
SENTINEL, July 16, 1994, at All.
10. See, e.g., Ronald Brownstein, Analysis Spotlight: Campaign '94 Issues are
Values, Morality Quayle Speech Gets New Respect, CINcrNNATi ENQUIRER, Aug. 2,
1994, at A2; David Dahl, To Restore Values, Take Responsibility, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, May, 10, 1993, at 1A; Marla Dickerson, What's Happened to the Nuclear
Family?, DET. NEws, Oct. 2, 1994, at 1B; Alan Gottlieb, Census: Nuclear Family No
Longer the Norm, DENv. POST, Aug. 30, 1994, at A2; Myron Magnet, The American
Family, 1992, FoRTUNE, Aug. 10, 1992, at 42; Lance Morow, Family Values: The
Republican Pitch Seems Cynical, But it Goes to the Soul of What Kind of Country
Americans Wan TIME, Aug. 31, 1992, at 22.
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deny that, as a statistical matter, children who live in single-par-
ent families live with a handicap as compared with children who
live in traditional two-parent families. The major cause of the
current alarm over single-parent families is the rapidity with
which their numbers have grown over the past several decades
combined with the results of numerous studies which indicate
that children who grow up in single-parent families tend to be
less successful in their education, their career, and their own
family life than children who live with both parents.11 There has,
therefore, been a growing consensus that the government should
try to reverse the current growth of single-parent families
through the various policy levers it has within its reach.
The correlation that Quayle made in his speech between the
welfare system and the destruction of the traditional family struc-
ture is a correlation that is widely made across the country by
everyone, from average citizens to influential politicians and
journalists.12 Many Americans assume that there is a causal con-
nection between welfare and family structure decisions, and that
if welfare were less available, less generous, or more temporary,
the numbers of single-parent families would decrease. Welfare is
perceived as encouraging low-income individuals to have chil-
dren they cannot afford, and to have them out-of-wedlock. Many
even claim that welfare encourages young women to have
unwanted children simply for the increase in benefits children
bring with them.13
The specific target of most welfare critics has been the now
defunct Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) pro-
gram, which primarily provided money and other benefits to sin-
gle mothers and their children.14 In recent years, and especially
in the recent debates in Congress over the new welfare law, 15 gov-
ernmental policy in the area of family structure decisions has
11. See Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right: Harmful Effects of
Divorce on Children, AL'Arn-c MoTHLY, Apr., 1993, at 47.
12. See, e.g., George J. Church, Fixing Welfare: A Consensus is Emerging on the
Need for Radical Reform, TIME, Feb. 16, 1987, at 18; Ulysses Currie, Welcome Welfare
Changes in Maryland, WASH. PosT, July 2, 1995, at C8; Joseph Perkins, War-torn
Poor Policies That Destroy Families Make Poverty a Vicious Cycle, SAN Dico UNION-
TRIB., Oct. 1, 1993, at B5; Robert Rector, Real Welfare Reform: Married Parents Who
Support Children, CINCINNATI POST, May 20, 1994, at 14A; Robert Rector, Welfare:
A System in Need of Change, Spending on Current Programs Promotes Behavioral
Poverty, ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATCH, June 27, 1995, at 15B.
13. See CHARLEs MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984).
14. See DIANE M. DiNrrro & THOMAS R. DYE, SOCIAL WELFARE PoLITcs
AND PUBLIC PoucY 102 (1983).
15. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
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been focused on AFDC and how it could be modified so as to
stem the increase in single-parent families. In this Note, I
examine one particular program, generically called Family Caps,
which is calculated to discourage the formation and growth of
single-parent families. Family Caps programs were introduced in
several states prior to the passage of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act
through the use of federal waivers. Such programs are currently
under consideration in many states now that the federal AFDC
program has been abolished and states have free rein to create
their own welfare policies.16
Unfortunately, while it is popular to blame AFDC for the
downfall of the family, it is also misguided to do so. Respected
studies have demonstrated that there is no practical correlation
between levels of AFDC benefits and family structure decisions,17
and efforts to implement change through AFDC will be futile at
best and harmful at worst. There are other options available to
the government to reduce the poverty levels of single and two-
parent families; these options would have the probable effect of
reducing the number of single-parent families. Poverty and fam-
ily disruption are linked, with one leading to another in a down-
ward spiral. If fewer children were born into poverty, then it is
less likely that these children will grow up with the feelings of
hopelessness that lead to unwise and harmful decisions regard-
ing childbearing.
This Note first gives a brief overview of the AFDC program,
highlighting the important developments in the program since
the 1930s. Part II explores the current popular perception of
AFDC as destructive to traditional two-parent families; this Part
also traces the roots of those perceptions. Part II then describes
society's recent awakening to the harm that single-parent families
are causing to children, and the realization of the enormous
impact this problem has on society. Part III discusses the Family
Caps programs that are being used to reform AFDC in some
states, and explains how these programs operate. The section
then explains how research and studies have proven conclusively
that changing the structure of welfare is not going to have a sig-
nificant impact on the problem of family breakdown. Part IV
explores other options that the government could be consider-
16. Part II of this Note will examine the major changes enacted by the
1996 welfare reform.
17. See David T. Ellwood & Mary Jo Bane, The Impact of AIDC on Family
Structure and Living Arrangements, 7 REs. LAB. ECON. 137 (1985); see also Robert
Moffit, Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review, 30J. ECON. LITERATURE
1 (1992); T. Paul Schultz, Marital Status and Fertility in the United States: Welfare
and Labor Market Effects, 29 J. HUM. RESOURCES, 637 (1994).
THE BREAKDOWN OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY
ing to improve the situation of the family in the United States,
and recommends that federal and state legislators focus on these
other options rather than welfare reform to stem the breakdown
of the family.
I. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AFDC PROGRAM
In 1935, the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program
was enacted as a part of the original Social Security Act.' 8 At its
inception, the program was not meant to be a permanent solu-
tion to poverty or a work-incentive program. It was simply con-
ceived as a temporary support program for children whose
parents were unable to support them. For example, a typical
ADC recipient at that time was a family in which the father (who
was usually the primary income earner) had died. In fact, in
1937, 43% of the ADC caseload was comprised of widows and
their children.19 The emphasis of the program initially, as signi-
fied by its name, was firmly on the needy children rather than on
the adult or adults who acted as their caretakers, and the needs
of these adults were not even calculated into the amount of
money the children received.2 ° As the program developed, how-
ever, it increasingly focused on adults, and in 1950 adult heads of
ADC households began to receive benefits alongside their
children. 2
1
As the program developed further through the 1950s and
early 1960s, the public began to perceive it as encouraging
fathers to desert their families, since a family could not receive
ADC if a father was unemployed and living in the same residence
as his wife and children. 22 As criticism of the program began to
swell, family patterns were also changing. More mothers were
working outside of the home, the divorce rate was increasing,
and out-of-wedlock births were also rising. 23 In response to the
criticism and changes in family patterns, the program was altered
in 1961 to allow a child to receive aid because of his parents'
18. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, ch. 531, §§ 401-406, 49 Stat.
620, 627-29 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-606 (1982)). The
original 1935 Social Security Act contained a total of 11 broad social programs.
Other programs included programs targeted at elderly and blind people,
specialized care and services for disabled children, and other child care
programs.
19. Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in Historical Perspective, 26 CoNN. L.
REv. 879, 880 (1994).
20. DiNrrro & DY, supra note 14, at 102.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 103.
23. Mink, supra note 19, at 880.
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unemployment and not just because of death or desertion. 24 In
1962, the name of the program was changed to its current name,
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to reflect a
new emphasis of the program on families.25
Other significant changes to the AFDC program were imple-
mented in 1962, most of them reflecting a new view of the poten-
tial of AFDC to be rehabilitative in nature. Programs were
designed to "reduce poverty by treating personal and social
problems which stood in the way of financial independence."26
Additional federal funds were given to states so that they could
provide counseling, vocational training, family planning services,
and legal services to their AFDC recipients.2 ' This approach
opened the door to a view of the AFDC program as a potential
lever to modify behavior. As a result, in 1967, when these serv-
ices had not produced significant improvement, a new approach
to encourage AFDC recipients to work was created. A program
called Work Incentive Now (WIN) was implemented in 1967; it
helped recipients to train for and locate jobs.28 WIN included
incentives to work which allowed the first $30 of earned income
each month to be completely disregarded in calculating benefits,
and total support amounts were based on only one-third of the
remaining monthly income. 29
Therefore, an employed AFDC recipient was rewarded for
being employed by being allowed to retain at least some of his
earnings over and above the amounts of his AFDC benefits.
Unfortunately, this new approach failed to achieve expected
results, as the numbers of families enrolled in the AFDC program
24. This alteration reflected a significant change in the character of ADC
recipients as a whole. Widows were 43% of the ADC caseload in 1937, but by
1961 they only accounted for 7.7%. Mink, supra note 19. Today, 3.75 million
mothers receive cash benefits under AFDC. Forty-eight percent of these
mothers have never been married at all. Twenty-two percent are widowed or
divorced. Seventeen percent are married but their husbands are absent.
Thirteen percent are married with their husbands present. Jill Young Miller,
Target Group of Welfare Reform is Less than 1 Percent of Total, SUN-SENTNEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Mar. 4, 1995, at 3A. Where death was the primary family
disruption in the 1930s, today divorce and non-marital birth have replaced the
death of a parent as the major disruption of families. Barbara Flory, Grandma's
Quilt has Become Frayed, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 3, 1995, at 13B.
25. DiNrrro & DYE, supra note 14, at 103.
26. Id at 105-06.
27. Id
28. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 204, 81
Stat. 821, 884-92 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 630-645 (1988)),
repealed by Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100485, § 202(a), 102 Stat.
2343, 2356-60 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988)).
29. DiNrrro & DYE, supra note 14, at 106.
THE BREAKDOWN OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY
continued to increase."0 Between 1968 and 1978, for example,
the number of AFDC recipients nearly doubled in size from a
little under two million recipient families to just under four mil-
lion recipient families.31 At the same time, the costs of the pro-
gram grew dramatically. In 1940, the cost of the program was
$133 million, in 1960 it was $750 million, and by 1980 it had
risen to almost $12.5 billion.3 2
Another major welfare reform occurred in 1988 with the
advent of the Family Support Act,33 which was termed at the time
to be the "most significant revision of the welfare system since
the New Deal." 4 This Act earmarked one billion dollars per year
for employment training, education, and child care costs.3 5 The
legislation reflected the growing distaste of the American people
for welfare and welfare recipients. Americans believed that
recipients needed support only "because women were having
children out-of-wedlock, men were sidestepping their responsi-
bilities to their children, and, despite the marked increase in the
labor force participation of women, both needed stronger attach-
ments to the work force."36 In order to achieve these goals, the
Family Support Act "moved on a number of fronts."37 To
increase parental responsibility, the Act required that states
establish paternity in AFDC cases and attempt to compel child
support from absent fathers.5 8 Mothers who wished to receive
AFDC benefits were required to cooperate in the paternity
actions. Any support payments received from these fathers were
given to the state, and the state was responsible for distributing a
support check to the mother.39 The Act also mandated employ-
ers to automatically withhold legally due child support payments,
30. Id.
31. Id. at 107.
32. Id at 108. These figures can be misleading. As a percentage of
government spending, AFDC expenditures have been cut by more than two-
thirds between 1971 and 1987. Today, AFDC expenditures constitute less than
4% of the total social welfare spending. Julie A. Nice, Welfare Servitude, 1 GEO. J.
FIGHTING POVERTY 340, 341 n.21 (1994).
33. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988)).
34. Mink, supra note 19, at 892.
35. Id.
36. JuNF AxrNN & HuEimA LEVIN, SoCIAL WEA u~aI: A HisTORY OF THE
AMERICAN RESPONSE TO NEED 289 (3rd ed. 1992).
37. Id
38. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343, 2344
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988)).
39. AxINN & LEVIN, supra note 36, at 289.
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and provided mechanisms for locating absent parents.4 ° A new
program, Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program
(JOBS) was established to require almost all AFDC beneficiaries
to become a part of the work force.41 To encourage employ-
ment, slightly higher amounts of earned income were disre-
garded from the calculation of benefits. Finally, the Family
Support Act required each state to evaluate their AFDC pro-
grams every three years and reassess their AFDC need and pay-
ment standards.42
The year 1996 saw the latest and most dramatic overhaul of
the welfare system as on August 22, President Clinton signed leg-
islation which "effectively end[ed] the federal government's six-
decade guarantee of aid to the poor."43 President Clinton, in his
campaign for election in 1992, vowed "to end welfare as we know
it,"44 and originally a welfare proposal which would have kept
AFDC as a federal program while imposing a tough two-year eligi-
bility limit coupled with generous funds for child care, job train-
ing, and health insurance.45  After intensive negotiations
between the House and the Senate and between Republicans
and Democrats, all of whom professed to share a commitment to
welfare reform, President Clinton twice vetoed Congress' final
product.46 The bills President Clinton vetoed would have com-
pletely replaced the current federal AFDC program, and handed
over the reins to each individual state by giving them block
grants and imposing some federal guidelines for how their pro-
grams should be structured.47 These proposals retained the two-
year cap on eligibility, prohibited aid to certain categories of peo-
ple, and placed a cap on each individual state's funding, ensur-
ing no guaranteed benefits even for those people meeting the
required criteria.4"
40. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343, 2344,
2353 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 652, 666 (1988)).
41. AxiNN & LEVIN, supra note 36, at 289.
42. Id. at 290.
43. Bruce B. Auster et al., A Blizzard of Bills from Congress: Wdl Welfare
Reform Worsen Life for the Poor?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Aug. 12, 1996, at 25.
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
44. Clinton: 'It's Time to Change America, 'USA TODAY, July 17, 1992, at 13A.
45. Robert Kuttner, Welfare Reform: A Race to the Bottom, SAN-DiEGo UNION-
TRIB., Sept. 27, 1995, at B7.
46. As We Don't Know It: Veto Exposes President Clinton's Sham Promises on
Welfare Reform, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 19, 1996, at A14.
47. House Vote on Welfare Reform Set: Plans Faces Tough Going in Senate,
PHOENIX GAZE-E, Dec. 21, 1995, at A23.
48. James Worsham, Recasting Welfare (1995 Welfare Reform Legislation),
NATION'S Bus., Nov. 1, 1995, at 30.
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The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act which President Clinton signed is not very different
from the two bills he vetoed.4 9 The Act turns welfare over to the
states, sets caps on the amount of time anyone may remain on
welfare, and requires one-half of each state's welfare recipients to
be working or training for ajob by 2002.50 It also cuts the availa-
bility of food stamps to some families and bars legal immigrants
from receiving food stamps. 1 The Act cuts $56 billion from
AFDC, food stamps, and other benefit programs, which is
approximately the same amount that would have been saved in
the plans the President vetoed in 1995.52
The Act abolishes AFDC as a federal entitlement program,
and instead provides states with block grants to fund a program
entitled Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)."
Unlike AFDC, TANF is not an entitlement, which means that the
amounts given to each state are fixed, and more funds are not
provided if need increases.5" Additionally, families may receive
TANF funds only for a cumulative total of five years, unlike AFDC
which provided assistance for an unlimited amount of time.55
Also, recipients must be employed by the time they have received
benefits for two years or when the state determines the parent or
caretaker is ready to work, whichever is earlier.56
II. CURRENT PERCEPTIONS OF AFDC AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
FAMILY
Although the criticisms lodged against AFDC in the past
were serious and reflected some deep misgivings about it, AFDC
faced greater criticism in 1996 than it ever had. The tremendous
controversy over welfare and AFDC arose from a collective sense
that the fundamental unit upon which our society is structured-
the family-was breaking down and that AFDC was the major




53. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 101-116, 110 Stat. 2110-85.
54. The portion of the Act which establishes the TANF program
specifically provides: "This part shall not be interpreted to entitle any
individual or family to assistance under any State program funded under this
part " Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103(a) (1), 110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (codified at 42
U.S.C. 601, 602 (1994), as amended by Personal Responsibility and Work
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contributor to the deterioration. Public desire for welfare
reform escalated as people's dissatisfaction with it grew. By the
late 1980s, badmouthing the welfare system had almost become a
clich6. In February of 1987, Time Magazine reported:
The criticisms are such time worn staples of conservative
oratory that by now anyone who reads about welfare can
reel them off from memory. The system is a monstrous
mess: it breaks up families, traps the poor in degrading
idleness and breeds a self-perpetuating cycle of illegiti-
macy, poverty and government dependency.
5 7
More specifically, there was and is a popular perception that
AFDC benefits directly contribute to single-parenthood. People
seem to want to believe that AFDC benefits encourage family dis-
ruption. The Time article also demonstrates the strong desire to
believe that AFDC programs are linked to family breakdown
because they appear to create economic incentives for the forma-
tion of single-parent families:
The issue of whether welfare in fact encourages illegiti-
mate births has been hotly debated. Most studies show there
is no direct causal relationship. But the AFDC program, by its
very nature, inevitably provides some economic incentives
for the creation of single-parent families.58
Since 1987, the news media has continued the tradition of laying
the blame for single-parent families on the doorstep of AFDC
programs.59
A. Charles Murray's Influence on the United States' Perceptions of
AFDC
Why the country is so willing to blame AFDC for the
problems with the family is rooted in the increasingly negative
attitude towards welfire that began to pick up steam in the
1980s. An extremely influential work which contributed to this
view was Charles Murray's book, Losing Ground.6 ° Murray's book
on the failings of the United States' social policies regarding the
57. George C. Church, Fixing Welfare: A Consensus is Emerging on the Need
for Radical Reform, TiME, Feb. 16, 1987, at 18.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. See supra note 12.
60. MuRRAV, supra note 13. Charles Murray exploded into the welfare
debate in 1984 with the publication of Losing Ground Murray's central thesis,
that welfare programs have been the major cause of family breakdown, led him
to the conclusion that AFDC should be completely abolished. While at the time
his book was published his conclusions remained on the outer fringes of the
welfare debate, they are today much more generally accepted, such that even
President Clinton has affirmed many of Murray's conclusions in Losing Ground
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poor examines the plight of the poor and the United States'
social welfare system from an economic perspective, studying
what economic incentives the welfare system places on the poor.
Murray uses a nondescript couple, Harold and Phyllis, as a "typi-
cal" unmarried couple with only high school education facing an
unwanted pregnancy to illustrate his points.6" He factors out
other potential influences on the decisions this couple makes by
making them completely average in every respect, and ignoring
societal, moral, or cultural influences that might come to bear on
these decisions:
I deliberately make [Harold and Phyllis] unremarkable
except for the bare fact of being poor. They are not of a
special lower-class culture. They have no socialized
propensities for "serial monogamy." They are not people
who we think of as "the type who are on welfare."...
Neither of them is particularly industrious or indolent,
intelligent or dull. They are the children of low-income
parents, are not motivated to go to college, and have no
special vocational skills.62
Murray looks at Harold and Phyllis and their decisions twice-
once in 1960 and once in 1970-and also makes a point of dis-
counting the changing societal influences upon their decisions:
"We shall ignore the turbulent social history of the intervening
decade. We shall ignore our couple's whiteness or blackness.
We simply shall ask: Given the extant system of rewards and pun-
ishments, what course of action makes sense?"63
Murray picks these two points in time in order to demon-
strate the changes in the structure of AFDC between 1960 and
1970, and how these changes were responsible for the deteriora-
tion of the traditional family. In1960, Murray emphasizes, there
were many negatives which influenced Harold and Phyllis' deci-
sion of whether to take full advantage of the potential benefits
they could receive from AFDC. 64 If Phyllis had the baby out-of-
wedlock, AFDC benefits would amount to only $23 per week, and
then only if she complied with several conditions. She could not
take on any outside employment as any outside money earned
would decrease her AFDC payments dollar-for-dollar. Also in
1960, AFDC had the "man in the house rule"65 that prohibited
Peter A. Brown, His Welfare Views Gain Audience, But Charles Murray Took Heat for
Same Ideas Years Ago, STAR-TR. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), June 6, 1994, at 4A.
61. Id. at 156.
62. Id. at 156-57.
63. Id. at 157.
64. Id. at 157-58.
65. DiNrrro & DYE, supra note 14, at 103.
1997]
772 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 11
any benefits for the woman if a man was living in her household.
Thus, if Phyllis received AFDC, Harold would not be able to live
with her, and she would certainly be unable to support both of
them from her small income. Assuming Harold wished to be
responsible for Phyllis and the baby, the most attractive option
for both of them, according to Murray, was to set up a household
together and have Harold work at a minimum-wage job.6 6 This
would allow them to live together and get married if they wished,
and it would allow Phyllis to get a full or part-time job to supple-
ment Harold's income if she chose. Overall, according to Mur-
ray's economic analysis, in 1960 the set of economic incentives
that were in place encouraged the "average" unmarried couple
with a child to stay off of AFDC and to support themselves, but
did not influence their decision to marry.
By 1970, everything had changed. In 1960, the couple's
three objections to Phyllis going on welfare were "too little
money, no way to supplement it, and having to live separately
from [one another]."67 However, in 1970 none of these objec-
tions were present. The total benefits Phyllis could receive from
AFDC were much greater. Phyllis could receive $50 per week in
cash and $11 per week in food stamps, and was also eligible for
Medicaid.68 She also had the option to work to supplement her
income up to $30 per week, and after that "her benefits [were]
reduced by two dollars for every three additional dollars of
income."69 Harold's income would not reduce AFDC benefits at
all so long as he was not legally responsible for the child. The
third problem with AFDC in 1960, that Harold could not live
with Phyllis, was no longer an issue because of a Supreme Court
ruling preventing this from being used as a criterion for receiv-
ing AFDC benefits.7 °
Murray further argues that the 1970 AFDC system
encouraged Phyllis to have and keep her baby, even if her natu-
66. MURRAY, supra note 60, at 158.
67. Id. at 159.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (holding that Alabama's
disqualification from AFDC of any mother cohabiting with a man who was not
obligated to support her was inconsistent with the Social Security Act). Before
the "man in the house" rule was overruled in King, it was common practice for
AFDC caseworkers to visit their clients in the form of "midnight raids" in order
to catch a "man in the bed." Any able-bodied male who resided with the AFDC
family was considered responsible for its financial support. See Susan D.
Bennet, "No Relief but Upon the Terms of Coming into the House "-Controlled Spaces,
Invisible Disentitlements, and Homnelessness in an Urban Shelter System, 104 YALE L.J.
2157, 2186 (1995).
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ral inclination would be either to have an abortion or give the
child up for adoption:
If [Phyllis] gives up the baby for adoption (or, in some
states by 1970, has a legal abortion), she will be expected to
support herself; and, as in 1960, the only job she will be
able to find is likely to be unattractive, with no security and
a paycheck no larger than her baby would provide. The
only circumstance under which giving up the baby is rational is if
she prefers any sort of job to having and caring for the baby.'
Murray deliberately limits his focus to economic factors only. He
does not consider any of the factors that might go into a woman's
decision to have a child other than financial ones: "It is com-
monly written that poor teenaged girls have babies so they will
have someone to love them. This may be true for some. But one
need not look for psychological explanations."7 Murray finally
argues that from Phyllis' perspective it was against her interests to
marry Harold under the 1970 AFDC system. If she and Harold
got married and Harold had a job, then she could not receive
AFDC benefits. Thus, once they married they could depend only
upon his earnings from his minimum-wage job. Even if he made
a little more from his job than Phyllis would receive from welfare,
Phyllis was still in a worse position because she had no control
over his paychecks, where she would have complete control over
her AFDC income. Also, welfare income from the government is
more dependable than earnings from Harold's minimum-wage
job, and Phyllis would not have to worry about what would hap-
pen financially if her relationship with Harold should deterio-
rate. 7' Remaining unmarried was really the best alternative for
both Harold and Phyllis under Murray's analysis because that
course allowed them to live together while adding Harold's
wages onto Phyllis's AFDC benefits.
Murray hypothesizes that these economic factors which
come into play in the decisions of a "normal" couple, such as
Harold and Phyllis, become more influential when one factors
back in some of those qualities that Murray left out of his exam-
ple such as "lower-class and black cultural influences that are said
to foster high illegitimacy rates and welfare dependency."74 Mur-
ray claims that when "economic incentives are buttressed by
social norms, the effects on behavior are multiplied," but that
71. MuRRAY, supra note 60, at 160.
72. Id.
73. I& at 160-61.
74. Id at 162.
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these "social factors are not necessary to explain behavior."75
Overall, what Murray suggests and criticizes in his writing is that
the changes in the AFDC system in the United States have pro-
vided incentives for people to create single-parent families.76
Losing Ground was an extremely important book because it articu-
lated and put into a logical argument exactly what so many
Americans already thought about the welfare system and its
effect on the family.
B. Barabara Dafoe Whitehead's Influential Article on Family
Structure
Thus far, this Note has alluded to the damage that single-
parent families, illegitimacy, divorce, and teen-age pregnancy are
doing to the country without specifying exactly what that damage
is. The view that the American family is facing challenges that
reach the crisis level was espoused by Dan Quayle in his 1992
speech. A more fact-based support of Dan Quayle's pronounce-
ments was published almost a year later in Barbara Dafoe White-
head's influential article, Dan Quayle Was Right: Harmful Effects of
Divorce on Children.77 The article attempts to challenge the toler-
ance with which many Americans viewed divorce and single-
parenthood by examining the damaging effects of these condi-
tions on children. Whitehead explains that a shift in the percep-
tion of divorce and out-of-wedlock births occurred during the
1970s because "[w] hat had once been regarded as hostile to chil-
dren's best interests was now considered essential to adults' hap-
piness."78 Divorce and non-marital birth ceased to be perceived
as damaging to children, and there was no longer a sense that
parents should remain in an unhappy marriage for the sake of
the children. Whitehead describes this change in the perception
of divorce and out-of-wedlock births as a "cultural shift" necessary
to allow adults to engage in self-fulfilling behavior without feel-
ing as though they were placing their happiness before their own
children's. 79 Whitehead denounces the modem perception of
these "disruptive behaviors" as contributing further damage to
the family structure:
This cultural shift helps to explain what otherwise would
be inexplicable: the failure to see the rise in family disrup-
75. Id.
76. Many disagree with Murra)r on this point. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER
JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY. RACE, POvERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS
(1992).
77. Whitehead, supra note 11, at 47 (1993).
78. 1I at 52.
79. Id.
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tion as a severe and troubling national problem. It
explains why there is virtually no widespread public senti-
ment for restigmatizing either of these classically disruptive
behaviors and no sense-no public consensus-that they
can or should be avoided in the future.
8 0
One reason for the increased concern over divorce and out-
of-wedlock births is that their rates began to soar in the middle of
the 1960s. Up until the early 1960s the divorce rate had
remained at less than ten divorces per 1000 marriages for years.8 '
Starting in 1965, the divorce rate began to increase until it had
more than doubled to twenty-three divorces per 1000 marriages
in 1979.82 Out-of-wedlock births also increased sharply from 5%
in 1960 to 27% in 1990.83 As Whitehead explains, this situation
perpetuated itself, as one divorce in a family increases the likeli-
hood that there will be another disruption within the same
family:
Following divorce, many people enter new relationships.
Some begin living together. Nearly half of all cohabiting
couples have children in the household. Fifteen percent
have new children together. Many cohabiting couples
eventually get married. However, both cohabiting and
remarried couples are more likely to break up than
couples from first marriages.
84
Also, this cycle has significant implications for the more distant
future of these children, as the fact that their parents are
divorced makes it much more likely that these children will
themselves divorce later on in their lives. 85
Whitehead attributes many negative consequences to the
rise of divorce and out-of-wedlock births. According to the evi-
dence Whitehead sets forth, "children in families disrupted by
divorce and out-of-wedlock births do worse than children in
intact families on several measures of well-being."86 Whitehead
lists many of the impacts of these types of families. Children in
single-parent families are six times more likely to be poor, and
are more likely to stay poor longer than their counterparts in
two-parent families.87 Children from single-parent families are
80. Id
81. Id at 50.
82. Id at 52.
83. Id
84. Id
85. Jane Shaw, People Problems: Some Children of Divorce Face Lifelong
Problems, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 22, 1995, at 065.
86. Whitehead, supra note 11, at 47.
87. Id
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more likely to have emotional problems, to drop out of school, to
become pregnant as teenagers, to abuse drugs, and to have
problems with the law than children in two-parent families.88
Not only do these single-parent families negatively impact
childhood, but Whitehead finds that many of these children
carry problems into their adulthood. While not every child of a
non-traditional family has problems as an adult, "research shows
that many children from disrupted families have a harder time
achieving intimacy in a relationship, forming a stable marriage,
or even holding a steady job."89 Also, children and divorced
wives suffer economically from living in a non-traditional fam-
ily.90 Children's parents are their primary means of support, and
in the typical situation where the children are living with the
mother, the father's support is dramatically reduced and often
non-existent. Financial support from the mother, furthermore,
is less in the divorced or never-married family than in intact two-
parent families.9"
Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefur in their book, Growing
Up with a Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps, discuss in more
detail the causes of the damage that single-parent families do to
children and adults.92 They examine the effects of single
parenthood through an analysis of three different factors: educa-
tional attainment, labor force attachment, and early family for-
mation.9" Through this analysis, McLanahan and Sandefur come
to the same conclusions as Whitehead about the disadvantages
faced by children in single-parent families.
McLanahan and Sandefur also analyze what causes these
children to be disadvantaged. Their studies indicate that about
45% of the damage is caused by the differences in income
between single and two-parent families.94 They suggest that
money is a factor because parents with more money can afford to
send their children to better schools and private extra-curricular
activities like summer camp or music lessons.95 Also, a child who
knows that his parents can afford to send him to college is more
motivated to work hard in school, and has more hope for the
88. Id.
89. Id
90. Id at 62.
91. Id
92. SARA McLAHAN & GARY SANDrUR, GROWING Up WITH A SINGLE
PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HFT.us (1994).
93. Id. at 19.
94. Id. at 94.
95. Id
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future.9 6 A final factor is that parents with more money tend to
live in better neighborhoods which affects the child's general
attitude towards school and the future.97
McLanahan and Sandefur attribute the rest of the disadvan-
tage to children from single-parent families to the difference in
parenting between single-parent and two-parent families.
McLanahan and Sandefur believe that:
besides economic security, children need parents who are
willing to spend time with them reading, helping with
homework, or just listening to how their day went at
school. They also need parents who are willing and able to
monitor and supervise their social activities outside school
... [M] any children get off on the wrong track not because
they lack talent or have the wrong values but because their
opportunities for getting into trouble are higher.98
McLanahan and Sandefur suggest that parental involvement and
supervision are by necessity lower in single-parent families. The
obvious reason for this is that there is one less parent involved on
a regular basis with the child's upbringing, but a more subtle rea-
son is that in general single-parent families are less stable than
two-parent families, and this "creates uncertainty about house-
hold rules and parental responsibility."99 Overall, children in
single-parent families spend a significantly smaller amount of
time with their fathers (and some spend no time with their father
at all) and somewhat less time with their mothers (because she
probably has a full-time job) than do children in two-parent fami-
lies.' Ultimately, the quality of parenting in a single-parent
family is likely to be much lower than the quality of the parenting
in two-parent families, and this combined with the lower finan-
cial status of children in single-parent homes accounts for their
overall lower state of well-being. 1° 1
96. Id
97. Id
98. Id. at 95.
99. Id. at 96.
100. Id at 96-98.
101. Id at 115.
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III. FAMILY CAPS: A MISGUIDED APPROACH TO SOLVING THE
PROBLEM
10 2
A. An Introduction to Family Caps
Family Caps proposals are the result of a combination of the
views reflected in the Whitehead article and Charles Murray's
book. A Family Caps program aims "[to eliminate] the incre-
ment in benefits under the program for which that family would
otherwise be eligible as a result of the birth of a child during the
period when the family is eligible for AFDC benefits."'0 3 Prior to
the passage of the Welfare Reform Act in August of 1996, states
could receive federal waivers to implement Family Caps pro-
grams. 10 4 With the advent of the Act in 1996, Family Caps
became one of the many options open to the states in developing
their welfare programs.1
05
New Jersey's Family Caps program is the most prominent in
the country, and is representative of the essential elements in the
programs and proposals in other states. New Jersey's program,
also called Child Exclusion, was part of a six-bill package called
102. While this section challenges the effectiveness of Family Caps as a
policy measure, other writers criticize these programs on different grounds.
Most challenges focus on the constitutionality of Family Caps and whether they
violate constitutional rights to privacy, procreation, and reproductive choice, as
well as the Equal Protection Clause. See Yvette Marie Barksdale, And the Poor
Have Children: A Harm-Based Analysis of Family Caps and the Hollow Procreative
Rights of Welfare Beneficiaries, 14 LAw & INEQ. J. 1 (1995); Marion Buckley,
Eliminating the Per-Child Allotment in the AFDC Program, 13 LAw & INEQ. J. 169
(1994); Laura M. Friedman, Family Cap and the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine: Scrutinizing a Welfare Woman's Right to Bear Children, 56 Omo ST. L.J. 637
(1995); James M. Sullivan, The New Jersey Child Exclusion: Model or Mess?, 2 GEO. J.
FIGHTING POVERTY 127 (1994); Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior
Modification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719 (1992).
103. Sullivan, supra note 102, at 129.
104. Devolving Welfare Programs to the States: A Public Choice Perspective, 109
HARv. L. REv. 1984, 1994-95 (1996). In his State of the Union address in 1992,
President Bush announced his intent to make the waiver process faster and
easier, which increased the number of requests for waivers. As ofJanuary, 1996,
at least 39 states had received a federal waiver to implement innovative state
programs. Id. at 1995.
105. Many states are now implementing or considering whether to
implement Family Caps programs. See, e.g., Wlson Signs Welfare Cut Plan: AFDC
Reductions Will Start Jan. 1, SAN-DIEGO UNION TIUB., Nov. 29, 1996, at A3; Joel
Dresang, W-2 Start-Up Put on a Fast Track: Phase-in Will Start This Month,
MILWAUKEE J. & SENTIN.L, Jan 8, 1997, at 1; Thomas Frank, Welfare Proposal
Passes First Test, DENV. PosT, Feb. 8, 1997, at Al; Cindy Loose, D.C. Options for
Welfare Cover Range: Task Force Considering Family Cap, Drug Tests, WAsH. PosT,
Jan. 5, 1997, at B1; Laura Williamson, Georgia Legislature Welfare: Governor's
Proposals a Win for Republicans, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 12, 1997, at C2.
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the Family Development Act.1" 6 Normally, a family on AFDC
would receive additional benefits for each additional child the
mother has while on AFDC to compensate the family for the
additional expenses of a new child. Before the enactment of
Child Exclusion, an AFDC family in New Jersey would receive an
additional $64 per month when a new child was born. 107 Child
Exclusion bars such families from receiving any additional
money upon the birth of a new child. The denial of additional
benefits to compensate for the expenses of a new child is the
defining characteristic of all Family Caps programs. Most Family
Caps programs, including New Jersey's Child Exclusion, include
a ten-month grace period for new applicants to AFDC so that a
family which bears a new child up to ten months after applying
for AFDC can receive the additional benefits for that child. A
final feature of New Jersey's Child Exclusion program is the
inclusion of an income disregard, which allows a certain amount
of earned monthly income to be disregarded when calculating
the amount of monthly aid a family received."0 8
The goals behind the enactment of Family Caps programs
are fairly obvious. They are meant to discourage women receiv-
ing state or federal aid from having more children and to
encourage them to find employment in order to wean them off
of welfare. New Jersey's Child Exclusion program is meant to
hold families receiving welfare to similar "constraints faced by
employed families where there is no automatic increase in salary
when another child is born.""°  Proponents of New Jersey's
Child Exclusion also believe that if parents are not financially
penalized for finding employment, they will be more willing to
do so.
106. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-3.5 (West 1995). Child Exclusion is not the
only change implemented by the Family Development Act. The plan also
requires every AFDC family member to obtain a high-school diploma, and it
provides educational and vocational opportunities for those who succeed.
Those who do obtain employment and get off of AFDC may keep their
Medicaid benefits for two years instead of the federal limit of one. Penalties for
not using these opportunities, however, may be as much a 20% reduction in
benefits. NewJersey also changed several state laws that impeded marriage and
traditional family life in welfare households. Wayne R. Bryant, New Jersey's
Welfare Overhau4 WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1995, at C1. NewJersey's Child Exclusion
Program was challenged and upheld in federal district court in 1995. C.K. v.
Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991 (D.NJ. 1995) (upholding New Jersey's Child
Exclusion program on the grounds that encouraging responsible child-bearing
decision-making was a legitimate statutory goal).
107. See N.J. ADMrN. CODE, tit. 10, § 82-1.2(b) (1992).
108. Laura M. Friedman, supra note 102, at 640.
109. Sullivan, supra note 102, at 7.
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Ultimately, no family receiving TANF benefits has an incen-
tive to earn much money because they will lose their benefits if
they do so. Encouraging families on welfare to work a small
number of part-time hours under the income-disregard is not
likely to encourage the family to get off of welfare in favor of
employment, because working five or ten hours a week does not
require a significant commitment to employment. Furthermore,
it is often difficult or even impossible for a mother of several
small children to work at all. Besides the challenge of finding
affordable child care, many of these mothers "face a variety of
obstacles which make it difficult to make a successful transition
from the home to the workplace: gender discrimination, poverty,
lack of skills, and often disabilities and minority status."11 ° While
society now seems to expect women with children to work, only
one-fourth of married women not on AFDC are employed full-
time, and many others work only part-time or do not work at
all.111
Family Caps programs like New Jersey's Child Exclusion are
based on many assumptions, but the major assumption underly-
ing all of these programs is that the amount of AFDC benefits is
influential on women's family structure decisions.11 Generally,
current policy-makers seem to believe that if a single woman
receives less AFDC money then she will be less likely to have a
child, and that if she receives more AFDC money she will be
more likely to have a child. The basis for these assumption is
found in logic such as Charles Murray's, who, in his analysis of
AFDC families, considers only economic influences. Harold and
Phyllis were influenced in their decisions only by how much
money they could receive from welfare. While Murray's book
examines many of the significant changes in the AFDC system
between 1960 and 1970, his analysis depends on his original
hypothesis that economic factors are a major influence on indi-
viduals' decisions about family structure.
The impetus behind the Welfare Reform Act is similar to the
motivations behind Family Caps initiatives. In the very beginning
110. Freidman, supra note 102, at 642.
111. Id.
112. Thus far, studies on the effectiveness of NewJersey's Child Exclusion
Program have been inconclusive and fraught with political bickering.
Conservatives proclaimed the program a success when statistics showed a
decline in the number of births among New Jersey welfare mothers. Critics of
the program point out that the rate of decline in births was almost identical to
the decline in births in a specially designed control group of welfare families
who remained exempt from the caps on benefits. John Harwood, Poor Results:
Think Tanks Battle to Judge the Impact of Welfare Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30,
1997, at Al.
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of the section of the Act creating the block grants to the states for
TANF, Congress lays out certain findings which clearly indicate
the focus of this legislation. For example, the first three findings
are as follows:
(1) Marriage is the foundation of a successful society.
(2) Marriage is an essential institution of a successful soci-
ety which promotes the interests of children.
(3) Promotion of responsible fatherhood and motherhood
is integral to successful child rearing and the well-being of
children. 1
13
Following these first three findings is a long recitation of many of
the statistics discussed in Whitehead's article regarding the
recent dramatic increase in single-parent families and the links
between single-parent families and increased crime, poverty, and
welfare dependency.114 Also in the section of the Act creating
TANF is a list of its purposes, which include "prevent[ing] and
reduc[ing] the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and
establish[ing] annual numerical goals for preventing and reduc-
ing the incidence of these pregnancies" and "encourag[ing] the
formation and maintenance of two-parent families."1 5 Clearly,
the Act was created with family policy in mind. The desire to
discourage single-parent families and encourage the traditional
two-parent family was foremost in the minds of the legislators
who wrote- it. Like Murray, the authors of the Welfare Reform
Act believe that economic factors greatly influence the family
structure decisions of welfare recipients.
B. Studies Which Demonstrate that Family Caps and AFDC Reform
Will Not Work
Because so many law-makers and the American public at
large have attributed many of the negative changes in the struc-
ture of American families during the 1970s and 1980s to the wel-
fare system, many studies have been conducted to determine if
there was such a correlation between AFDC benefits and the fam-
ily structure decisions of women. One such study, conducted in
1985 by David T. Ellwood and Mary Jo Bane, has been given a
great amount of weight by subsequent social scientists research-
ing this issue.' 1 6 The study examines the impact of AFDC on
113. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2110.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Ellwood & Bane, supra note 17, at 137; see also Moffit, supra note 17,
at 1; Schultz, supa note 17, at 637. Both studies support the findings of
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three different family structure decisions women make: living
arrangements, divorce and separation, and childbirth.' 1 7
The study begins by pointing to an obvious contradiction of
the assumption that high AFDC benefits encourage single
women to bear children. Every state sets different amounts of
benefit levels in their welfare programs, and there are large varia-
tions between those amounts. In Mississippi in 1975, a family of
four could receive only $60 per month, while in the same year
many states allotted over $400 per month for a similar family.118
If Murray and today's law-makers are correct, then one would
suspect that Mississippi would have a much lower rate of single
motherhood than a state like Minnesota which has fairly high
benefits. However, the opposite is actually true-Mississippi had
a much higher rate of single motherhood. 1 9 Even after control-
ling for a number of variables which could affect an association
between welfare benefits and family composition, such as average
state income and education levels, the state's racial composition,
and the state's religious composition, there was still no correla-
tion between the levels of a state's welfare benefits and women's
family structure decisions.1 20 However, the major portion of the
study that Ellwood and Bane conducted was more sophisticated
then a simple comparison of level of benefits and family struc-
ture decisions across the states. The results of that kind of analy-
sis cannot indicate whether Mississippi's high unmarried birth
rate might not be even higher if there were higher AFDC
benefits.
The Ellwood and Bane study used three different methods.
The first, over-time comparisons, asked if there were greater
changes over a period of time in family structure in states where
there were greater changes in benefit levels. The second
method, comparisons of eligibles versus noneligibles, was based
on the eligibility rules of AFDC, which does not offer benefits to
divorced women without any children.' 2 ' This method
examined whether "the divorce rate of couples with children rel-
ative to that of childless couples. :.. [was] higher in states where
benefits are high."122 The third method, likely versus unlikely
recipient comparisons, looked at the various factors which make
Ellwood and Bane that welfare is not a significant factor in the family changes
which have occurred over the past two decades.




121. Id. at 139.
122. Id
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it more or less likely for a woman to be an AFDC recipient, such
as age, race, and educational background. It then compared
divorce and unmarried birth rates between states, looking to see
if in high benefit states, those people more likely to collect AFDC
had more divorces and unmarried births. 12 3 While Ellwood and
Bane believed the third method to be the most accurate, all
three methods indicated similar results with only slight
variations. 
124
As a result of the study, Ellwood and Bane concluded that
levels of AFDC benefits had different impacts on the three areas
of impact studied: living arrangements, divorce and separation,
and childbearing. They found that benefit levels "have a dra-
matic impact on the living arrangements of young single
mothers.' 2 15 In states with low benefit levels, young unmarried
mothers not living with a husband were a lot more likely to live in
their parent's home than in states with high benefits. As Ellwood
and Bane point out, this is a policy lever that has been essentially
unexplored by the government, as there has been little attention
on the benefits or detractions of a young unmarried mother liv-
ing at home.126 There are positives and negatives attached to
encouraging these women to stay at home. Living with her par-
ents, a young single woman with a child is probably more likely to
stay in school and may receive more emotional support than she
would on her own. On the other hand, the home could be an
abusive environment, and offering more welfare benefits could
allow young women to escape from an unhealthy situation. 127
While there was a strong correlation between levels of AFDC
benefits and living arrangements of young single mothers, the
study found that AFDC benefit levels had only a moderate impact
on divorce rates. For very young women, Ellwood and Bane
found that a $100 per month benefit increase would increase
divorce and separation rates by 5-15%.128 However, for older
women (over thirty years old), increases in AFDC benefits had
almost no effect on divorce and separation rates. Black women
were overall more likely to be influenced by AFDC levels than
white women in divorce and separation rates, although black
123. Id
124. Id
125. Id at 141. See also HILAR WILLAMSON HovYs, DoEs WELFARE Pt-Ay
ANYw ROLE IN FEMALE HEA~slp DECISIONS? (National Bureau of Econ. Research
Working Paper No. 5149, 1995); Robert Moffitt, Welfare Effects on Female
Headship with Area Effects, 29 J. HUM. RESOURCES 621 (1994).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 143.
128. Id at 142.
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women started out with a higher likelihood of divorce.1 29 This is
another area of AFDC reform that law-makers have not explored.
By far the area that has received the most attention from
society and policy-makers is the effect that the level of AFDC ben-
efits has on women's childbearing decisions. The assumption
that AFDC benefit levels do significantly affect these decisions is
what has inspired programs like Family Caps. This is, however,
by far the area least likely to be affected by changes in AFDC
benefit levels. Although there was a high correlation between
AFDC and living arrangements, and a moderate correlation
between AFDC and divorce and separation rates, Ellwood and
Bane found no correlation between AFDC benefits and childbear-
ing decisions. They state that across all three methods "[they]
found no real evidence supporting the proposition that welfare
and fertility among unmarried women are linked."1 3 °
Ellwood and Bane conclude that welfare's impact on
women's family decisions is dependent on the significance of the
decision. Living arrangements are most strongly affected by
AFDC levels because this decision affects only the woman's loca-
tion-she is simply deciding if she can afford to live on her own.
Divorce and separation are more significant because they involve
"more than a decision to live independently; [they involve] a
more complicated severing of emotional and most probably
financial ties that husband and wife have to each other."131
Therefore, AFDC has less of an impact on these decisions, and
where it does have a larger impact with younger women it is
probably because these women have weaker emotional and
financial ties to their husbands than do older women. Childbirth
has an enormous impact on a woman's life-it involves very
strong emotional and financial ties, and a commitment to the
care and upbringing of the child for many years. The fact that
AFDC levels have little impact on such decisions is therefore not
so surprising.
In her article, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification
Welfare Reform Proposals, Lucy Williams lists many of the reasons
that might go into an AFDC mother's decision to become preg-
nant and to remain pregnant, none of which would really be
addressed by Family Caps or any other kind of AFDC reform:
There are many reasons why AFDC mothers become preg-
nant or choose to remain pregnant. These reasons include
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a child solidifies a relationship with the father, the assump-
tion that children represent an economic value . . . , the
belief that the significant health problems and infant mor-
tality rates associated with poverty increase the risk that a
single woman with only one child will become childless, a
sense that one's life is so hopeless that having a child gives
it value and meaning, and the desire to give a grandchild
to one's own mother.
1 32
The decision to have a child, as Ellwood and Bane's study sug-
gests, is simply too personal and requires too much of a commit-
ment to be attributable to financial motivations. Rather, many of
the reasons Williams cites are the result of the poverty in which
AFDC women live, which would only be worsened by drastic cuts
in AFDC benefit levels.
Ellwood and Bane ultimately conclude that AFDC cannot be
held accountable for the family structure changes which have
occurred over the past two decades:
Dramatic cuts in welfare would change the lives of poor
women: [they] would reduce the incomes of single
mothers, [they] would influence the location where many
single mothers live, and [they] might even reduce the
number of single mothers slightly. Ultimately, however,
[they] would do little to slow the growth in single-parent
families. Welfare simply does not appear to be the under-
lying cause of the dramatic changes in family structure of
the past few decades.13 3
If Ellwood and Bane are correct, federal and state governments
are currently vigorously pursuing a policy measure that cannot
be successful. The use of AFDC modification to change womens'
childbearing decisions is premised on the belief that "AFDC
mothers have many children, that they have free access to medi-
cal options for family planning, and that they get pregnant in
order to receive additional benefits .... ,,13 The truth about
AFDC families is that they consist on average, including adults, of
slightly under three people, and that 90% of the families have
three children or fewer.'3 - Many AFDC women have no access to
family planning and medical services, and those women that may
wish to terminate their pregnancies often do not have access to
abortion facilities.'3 6 Ultimately Family Caps and other AFDC
132. Williams, supra note 102, at 738-39.
133. Ellwood & Bane, supra note 17, at 143.
134. Williams, supra note 102, at 737.
135. Id. at 737.
136. Id. at 738.
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modification plans as policy measures to influence child-bearing
decisions "are inherently flawed because they are based on the
assumption that the value systems of AFDC mothers are funda-
mentally alien to those of the rest of the population."
117
lV. OTHER METHODS FOR REFORM
Some of the difficulty in coming up with solutions to the
problems which are undermining the growth of supportive and
healthy families in the United States lies in the ambiguous nature
of the problems themselves. Irregular family structure and pov-
erty are complex when studied in conjunction because one leads
to the other. Living in a single-parent family increases the
chances of being poor, while being poor increases the chances of
living in a single-parent family. In this sort of a chicken-and-egg
dilemma, it is difficult to know which of these problems to focus
on when trying to work out solutions. This has caused disagree-
ment among analysts of this issue, some of whom believe that low
income is the cause of single-parenthood, while others believe
that low income is the result of single-parenthood. 3 ' There are
only a few levers that the state or federal governments can use to
influence family structure. Those measures include: 1) making
life more difficult for single-parent families, 2) providing more
education and counseling to aid in family structure decisions, 3)
making it more difficult for absent parents to escape responsibil-
ity, and 4) encouraging the growth of two-parent families by
helping those that face poverty.13
9
A. Making Life More Difficult for Single-Parent Families
One approach, previously addressed, is to "give less and
expect more from single parents."140 David Ellwood, finding it
"strange" that it is this option that most policy-makers have
focused on, argues not only what has been discussed in this
Note-that this sort of an approach is ineffective-but that this
method would actually worsen the situation. The goal of this
method is to "sacrifice the current generation of children in sin-
gle-parent homes in the hope that the next generation will not
be born."1 4 1 Reducing benefits or implementing programs like
Family Caps creates a moral dilemma as it makes families that are
137. M at 736.
138. McLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 92, at 10-11.
139. DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY
75-76 (1988).
140. Id. at 76.
141. Id
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already poor, even with the government assistance, even poorer.
While this approach could marginally reduce the number of
births to unmarried women, it could force women to leave their
children in unsafe conditions in order to obtain work or to make
even more desperate choices.
42
B. Providing Information, Education, and Counseling to Aid in
Family Structure Decisions
Other steps the government could take are less morally
questionable. One policy the government could employ is to
take a more active role in providing information, education, and
moral guidance to aid people in making decisions about child-
birth, sexual activity, contraception, and marriage. This method
is especially appropriate in attempting to prevent teenage
pregnancies:
Teenage pregnancy is one of the few aspects of single
parenthood that is clearly undesirable. The overwhelming
proportion of teenagers do not want children and those
who do simply cannot realize what they are in for. It is not
rational to get pregnant at 17, no matter what the alterna-
tives appear to be. Teenage pregnancy is a matter of infor-
mation, contraception, and sexual activity, all of which
might plausibly be changed.14
3
Ellwood promotes having clinics within high schools offering
information, counseling, as well as contraceptives. 1 4 Currently,
there is not much government effort to provide such services to
adolescents. 145 Because of a lack of agreement between liberals
142. Id. at 77.
143. Id. at 76.
144. Two recent cases have examined the constitutionality of condom
distribution programs that do not require parental consent. See Alfonso v.
Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 1993), appeal dismissed, 614 N.Y.S.2d
388 (1994) (holding that the program, by not requiring parental consent,
violated parents' constitutionally protected liberty interest in directing their
children's upbringing and education); Curtis v. School Committee, 420 Mass.
749 (1995) (holding that parental involvement in such programs is not
constitutionally required). For further discussion of these two cases, see Jeffrey
F. Caruso, Sex Education and Condom Distribution:John, Susan, Parents, and Schools,
10 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETmcs & PUB. POL'Y 663 (1996).
145. The government did make such an effort in the 1980s. In 1981,
Congress passed the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA) which was created to
promote and fund counseling and care for pregnant adolescents. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 300z (1995). The AFLA was designed to promote moral choices and it
emphasized abstinence and alternatives to abortion. It also encouraged its
grantees to include churches and other religious organizations to participate in
their programs. The Act was challenged under the Establishment Clause and
upheld in a Supreme Court case in 1988. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589
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and conservatives on this issue "[f] ederal policy remains caught
in the cross fire between liberals, who favor government-subsi-
dized birth-control services for adolescents, and conservatives,
who argue that providing such assistance undermines parental
authority and legitimates sexual promiscuity."' 46 In the early
1990s only about two dozen high schools nationwide had con-
dom distribution programs, and more than half of the nations
sexually active teenagers had no access to reproductive health
services. 1
4 7
Although there is some evidence to support Ellwood's sug-
gestion that programs offering counseling and contraceptive
information could be helpful in preventing teenage
pregnancies, 48 it would not be wise to rely on programs such as
those to solve the entire problem of teenage pregnancy. Coun-
seling and family planning programs have met with limited suc-
cess in the past, and studies have shown that these kinds of
services are too limited be successful in addressing the roots of
the problem of teenage pregnancy. 149 These studies have indi-
cated that "many of the ill effects associated with adolescent preg-
nancy are rooted in poverty, a condition not explicitly addressed
by any of the programs and services." 50 These programs are
mostly organized as a form of crisis intervention, offering short
term advice and counseling, but they do not have any long term
involvement with the teenagers who use their services. While
programs such as these are certainly not harmful, and do offer
short term aid to those who need it, it is unlikely that counseling
and family planning programs can have any great impact on the
incidence of teenage pregnancy.
(1988). The AFLA currently provides about $10 million yearly in funding for a
number of private groups (one-fourth of which have religious ties) for
counseling and other programs to discourage adolescent sex. Ruth Marcus,
Funding for Religious Groups to Promote Chastity Upheld: Church-State Entanglement
Not 'Excessive, 'WASH. POST, June 30, 1988, at A21.
146. Deborah L. Rhode, Adolescent Pregnancy and Public Policy, in TIE
PoLMcs OF PREGNANCY 317 (Deborah L. Rhode & Annette Lawson eds., 1993).
147. Id. at 317-18.
148. See Kristin A. Moore & Steven B. Caldwell, The Effect of Government
Policies on Out-of-Wedlock Sex and Pregnancy, 9 FAm. PLAN. PERSP. 164 (1977).
149. Richard A. Weatherley et al., Comprehensive Programs for Pregnant
Teenagers and Teenage Parents: How Successful Have They Been?, 18 F A. PLAN.
PEasp. 73 (1986).
150. Id. at 77.
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C. Making it More Difficult for Absent Parents to Escape Child
Support Responsibility
Another way for the government to promote the growth of
healthy families is to try to force absent parents to have more
responsibility in at least the financial well-being of their children.
While 97% of all Americans believe that absent fathers should
contribute some child support, only one-third of all single
mothers receive any child support at all.' By not requiring
absent parents to provide support for their children "[w]e are
sending a clear signal. Not only do absent parents generally not
have any responsibilities, we offer financial rewards to fathers for
avoiding their responsibilities in that they do much better away
from their families than with them."'52
Single welfare mothers are unlikely to collect any child sup-
port from an absent father. Under the Family Support Act of
1988 child support for welfare mothers is compulsory. Mothers
who wish to participate in AFDC must cooperate in establishing
the paternity of her children so the state can attempt to recoup
some of its spending from the absent fathers.' 3 However, under
the Family Support Act, the primary means through which a non-
complying father's child support obligations are enforced is
through wage-withholding, which goes into effect once the father
is one month behind in is payments. Unfortunately, wage-with-
holding is effective only when there are wages to withhold.
Fathers of children on welfare are typically in a low income
bracket. One study indicated that over half of welfare children's
fathers were unemployed at least one time over a two-year
period, the average amount of time of unemployment being
fourteen weeks per year. 54 Low income fathers are frequently
unemployed and often change employment.155 Therefore, if
there is no voluntary compliance with a child support order,
chances of receiving the support money from the father through
other means are slim as the system currently stands.' 56
151. ELLWOOD, supra note 139, at 78.
152. Id.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (26) (B) (1994); 45 C.F.R. § 232.12 (1987).
154. Deborah Harris, Child Support for Welfare Families: Family Policy
Trapped in Its Own Rhetoric, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 619, 647 (1987/
1988).
155. Id.
156. A popular and widely discussed alternative to the current child
support system is one that was constructed by Irwin Garfinkel from Wisconsin's
Institute for Research on Poverty. Based on the "advance maintenance
payment" systems that are currently used in some other industrial countries,
this plan assures children of absent fathers a certain fixed monthly benefit. If
the father cannot be located or is unemployed, the state pays the support and
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D. Encouraging the Growth of Two-parent families by Helping Those
That Face Poverty
A final policy approach is to try and help two-parent families
remain strong and to cope better with the many challenges these
families face. This approach is the inverse of an approach like
Family Caps. Family Caps and other proposals that reduce AFDC
benefits make it financially more difficult to be a single-parent,
without providing a healthy alternative. Ellwood warns that:
[t] he notion that single-parent families are undesirable is
clear only when the alternative is a happy, loving, and
secure two-parent home. Because that is rarely the altema-
tive, the danger is that policies designed to inhibit the for-
mation of single-parent homes will encourage the
maintenance of equally unsatisfactory alternatives ....
[Therefore] only policies that encourage better arrange-
ments should be devised.
157
The critics of single-parent families are only critical of them as
opposed to two-parent families. The most basic assumption of
such criticism was that if single-parent families could be discour-
aged, then healthy two-parent families would be simultaneously
encouraged.
The welfare system is not a solution to two-parent family pov-
erty, because "[i] f we are really serious about reinforcing the val-
ues of autonomy, work, family, and community, then we must
find a way to improve the economic security of [two-parent fami-
lies] without putting them into a welfare system."' 58 While sin-
gle-parent family poverty gets a lot of the attention, two-parent
family poverty is just as serious. Single-parent families get most
of the attention because they have a much higher percentage of
poverty than two-parent families. However, two-parent families
are poor in equal numbers to single-parent families. 159 Opening
up welfare programs to two-parent families is not desirable
because welfare reduces rewards for working, and is "invasive,
inadequate, restrictive, and isolating."' 6° In trying to help two-
parent families:
takes the responsibility for collecting the debt. If the father is employed and
can be located the state ensures support by taking a percentage of the father's
income through his income taxes. If the father's income is too low to cover the
entire benefit, the state makes up the difference, and if the percentage taken is
higher than the fixed benefit, the surplus is passed on to the family. IRwIN
GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT 106 (1992).
157. ELLWOOD, supra note 139, at 75.
158. Ia. at 81.
159. I& at 83.
160. ELLWOOD, supra note 139, at 104.
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[t] he last thing we want to do is create a system that dis-
courages and penalizes work and that isolates and stigma-
tizes the very people who are struggling hard to become a
part of the economic mainstream. Instead, we want to find
ways to reinforce their efforts, to integrate them, and to




Therefore, increasing the availability of welfare benefits to two-
parent working families is not the best approach towards promot-
ing the growth of healthy families.
Better solutions try to raise wages and reduce unemploy-
ment in order to avoid the stigma of going on welfare for two-
parent families. Raising the minimum wage is one approach that
is frequently suggested as potential answer to the problem.
Because the minimum wage is now set so low, welfare programs
often function as a subsidy to those employers who do not pay
their employees enough:
Whether the services of a $4.50 worker are worth $5 or $15
per hour to the employer, the primary effect of having a
minimum wage substantially below the minimum cost of
living is to subsidize low-wage employers (or their custom-
ers) by means of the welfare payments that supplement the
non-living wage.' 62
If the minimum wage were set higher than the typical welfare
benefit level, not only would it be easier for those people who are
already working to stay off of welfare, but more people would
abandon welfare in favor of a job. 61
Another way to assist two-parent working families is through
the Earned-Income Tax Credit (EITC). The EITC offers an
alternative to welfare for working families by giving these families
earning low wages tax credits for each dollar earned.'6 4 It is one
161. Id. at 105.
162. Gerhard Stoll, We Don't Let Excess Labor Starve, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19,
1995, at A23.
163. Id.
164. David Wessel, Expanded Earned-Income Tax Credit Emerges as the Anti-
Poverty Program of Choice for Many, WALL ST. J., July 13, 1989. The earned-income
tax credit was a spin off of the earlier idea of the "negative income tax." See
Bruce Fuller, Virtual Policy: The Earned-Income Tax Credit Feels Good, but Does It Lift
Families Out of Poverty?, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 3, 1996, at 11. The idea of a negative
income tax is derived as a corollary to positive income taxes. In a positive tax
system, all income above a minimum threshold (standard deduction plus
personal exemption) is shared by requiring individual taxpayers to pay a
percentage of the excess income. A negative income tax then shares all
deficiencies below a minimum income by having taxpayers paying a percentage
of the deficit. A principal difference between the negative income tax and
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of the few anti-poverty programs that has been embraced by both
liberals and conservatives, as it both reinforces the value of hard
work and helps the poor without stigmatizing them through plac-
ing them in the welfare system.' 6 5 The EITC provides a tax
credit that represents a certain percentage of wage earnings up
to a maximum amount. It works on a bell curve, rising as the
worker's wages rise-the maximum benefits are received when
annual wages are between $7520 an $11,840. After this point the
credit gradually declines until it is non-existent at an annual wage
of $22,370.166 The structure of the EITC has a great advantage
over a blunt minimum wage hike, as EITC benefits go only to
low-income households. A minimum-wage increase cannot be
targeted only to those families most in need, and would support
low wage workers in high-income households.
V. CONCLUSION
Dan Quayle, in his 1992 speech, identified a national prob-
lem of immense proportions that has since been recognized by
the nation as a whole. The importance of maintaining a rela-
tively stable and healthy family life in the United States has never
been in dispute. Today, the proposition that traditional two-par-
ent married families are healthier and more supportive for chil-
dren and adults than single-parent families is no longer in
dispute. The controversy revolves around choosing which meas-
ures the government should take which will be supportive of the
development of healthy and stable families. Right now, current
policy assumes that the situation of the family can be improved
by minimizing the crutch of AFDC that supposedly encourages
the development and maintenance of single-parent families.
This assumption unfortunately ignores the evidence of studies
which indicate that AFDC reform will not have an impact on
women's child-bearing decisions. As Ellwood and Bane and Lucy
Williams suggest, a woman's decision to have a child is deeply
personal and, in the case of a woman receiving welfare benefits,
partially motivated by living in poverty conditions. The problem
of single-parent families is cyclic, whereby children living in sin-
gle-parent families are more likely to become single-parents
EITC is the tax base. EITC rewards only income that is earned, where a
negative income tax includes all income. Timothy J. Eifler, The Earned Income
Tax Credit as a Tax Expenditure: An Alternative to Traditional Welfare Reform, 28 U.
RicH. L. Rv. 701 (1994).
165. Paulette Thomas, Earned-Income Tax Credit Program Faces Increased
Scrutiny as It Expands, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1994, at A2.
166. Guy Gugliotta, How to Aid 'Working Poor'? Tax Credit Serves as Lifeline
but Has Its Critics, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1993, at Al.
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themselves. Using welfare reforms which will increase the pov-
erty levels of women and their children will only perpetuate the
cycle.
The ideas proposed in the last section of this Note are
potential solutions to an immense problem. There is no guaran-
tee that any one idea or combination of ideas will be effective in
encouraging the growth of healthy families. However, the nation
is currently heading down the wrong path. Welfare reform is not
likely to help families, and may cause their situation to worsen. If
we wish to help single-parent families and encourage the growth
of two-parent families, we should concentrate our resources on
pulling more families out of poverty rather than taking measures
which will make them more impoverished.

